CO129-497 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 361

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. March 1926,

Copy No. 18

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

BLOCKADE OF THE APPROACHES TO CANTON.

Report of the Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade in Time of War.

WE were requested to consider, and report on, the extent to which a blockade of the approaches to Canton, undertaken with prior international agreement, is likely to prove effective. An attempt to answer this question, on which we have had the benefit of the opinion of Sir Reginald Stubbs, late Governor of Hong Kong, is given below, but it must be emphasised that all consideration of political reactions* arising from this step have been omitted, except in so far as they immediately concern the efficiency of the measures contemplated.

IMPORTS.

2. The principal imports into Canton are shown in Appendix No. 1. Their origin cannot be stated with statistical accuracy.

Of these imports, the three most important in the daily life of the Cantonese are rice, the Southern Chinaman's bread; ground nuts, his butter; and firewood, which he uses largely for culinary purposes.

3. Rice.-Expressed in terms of weight, Canton imports yearly by sea about 300,000 tons of rice. In 1924 about half this amount came by sea from other parts of China.

Ground Nuts.—About 108,000 tons are imported per annum. The statistics show that these come almost entirely from China and from the fact that they are largely of local growth and could probably in any case be replaced from inland by other native products, their importance from a blockade point of view is less than

that of rice.

Firewood-Supplies of firewood come entirely from Chinese sources and originate mainly from Kuang-Hsi province. They are brought to Canton by river transport. The quantity is large, but unknown.

4. Of the imports enumerated in Appendix No. 1, it would seem possible, by blockade of the seaward approaches to Canton alone, to cut off all supplies of fuel except firewood, and of illuminants, except in so far as ground nut oil might be used; to diminish the common cereal supply very seriously; and to lessen slightly the amount of fatty substances available.

The effect of cutting off supplies of cotton textiles is economic and could not be immediate; experience has shown that, except when dealing with a power which utilises cotton textiles for narrowly military purposes, this restriction is only useful if extended for a period of about two years,

These political reactions were discussed in Foreign Office prints Confidential, F/319/1/10, of the 3rd February, 1926, Section 1, and F/439/1/10 of the 17th February, 1926, Section 1.

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